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Abstract
In this work, we study the interaction of strategic agents in continuous action Cournot games with limited
information feedback. Cournot game is the essential market model for many socio-economic systems where agents
learn and compete without the full knowledge of the system or each other. We consider the dynamics of the policy
gradient algorithm, which is a widely adopted continuous control reinforcement learning algorithm, in concave Cournot
games. We prove the convergence of policy gradient dynamics to the Nash equilibrium when the price function is
linear or the number of agents is two. This is the first result (to the best of our knowledge) on the convergence
property of learning algorithms with continuous action spaces that do not fall in the no-regret class.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reinforcement Learning (RL) has yielded impressive results in various sequential decision-making problems
in recent years. These successes include playing games with super-human performance [1], [2], solving complex
robotic tasks [3], [4], [5] and autonomous driving [6], [7]. Some of these applications focus on a single agent, but
many applications of interest consider groups of agents (or players). In the latter case, agents operate in a common
environment, each of them interacting with the environment and other agents. This multi-agent setting contains a
rich set of models and has received significant attention in the past several years (see [8] and references within).
In this paper, we study the dynamics of learning agents, where each agent aims to optimize its long-term expected
return by repeatedly participating in the game. This question has been mostly studied at two extremes, where the
agents are either fully cooperative [9] or they are fully competitive (i.e. zero-sum games) [10], [11]. Instead of these
extremes, we focus on the case of general-sum games, where the agents are self-interested but no adversarially so.
General-sum games have been widely used to model the interactions and competition in cyber-physical systems
because of the wide range of individual goals and possible relationships between agents [12], [13]. Each agent
in the games is self-interested, and reward may be conflicting with others, but often not in a zero-sum manner.
Compared to the two extreme cases, there have been relatively few convergence results for general-sum games,
partly because of the technical challenge caused by heterogeneous goals and limited information.
We focus on a specific class of general-sum games where the agents undergo Cournot competitions [14]. Cournot
game has been used to model the energy systems [15], transportation networks [16] and healthcare systems [17].
This work is partially supported by the National Science Foundation awards CNS-1931718 and ECCS-1807142.
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2It is also one of the most prevalent models of firm competition in economics. In the Cournot game model, firms
control their production level, which influences the market price. For example, some electricity markets can be
thought of as a Cournot game, where the production level is the amount of power produced by the generators, and
the price is decided by the total generation bid and the demand. Each generators payoff is then calculated as the
market price multiplying its share of the supply, subtracting its production cost [15].1 In this example the generators
do not cooperate with each other, but the total profit is also not zero.
When learning is not needed, there is a wealth of results for the Cournot competition. For example, when each
agent has full information about the game, including the price function and the cost function of all other agents, there
are many works characterizing the properties of the Nash equilibrium of the game [18], [19], [20]. However, when
learning is involved and agents do not have full information, the properties of the game are not well understood.
This is even the case in the simplest setting, where the agents only receive the price from the system as the feedback
but do not know the price function form nor the actions of other agents.
To answer what happens when agents learn, we must model how they learn - or more precisely, what type of
learning algorithms is used. A key technical challenge is that when learning is used, the Cournot game becomes
stochastic. Currently, most works focus on no-regret algorithms [21], [22], [23] because they only require a minimal
set of assumptions on the game. In addition, the no-regret definition could be directly translated to the coarse
correlated equilibrium condition [24] for a wide range of algorithms (e.g., multiplicative-weight [25], online mirror
descent [26], Follow-the-Regularized-Leader [27]). However, while the theoretical properties of no-regret algorithms
are attractive, they also limit the applicability of these algorithms. In practice, systems and agents are often not
adversarial to each other, and the competition is often designed to have specific structures. In many games, it is
more natural for players to use myopic policies such as reinforcement learning algorithms that directly aim for
profit maximization [28]. In addition, the notation of coarse correlated equilibrium can be quite weak, and sharper
results are often desired.
These algorithms can lead to much better performances than no-regret algorithms, but proving their convergence
has proven to be challenging [8] since the coupling between the (continuous) actions of the players must be carefully
analyzed. Attempts have been made to discretize the space(e.g., Q-learning [29]) then studying the resulting discrete
game, but the dimensionally quickly grows and important features (e.g., convexity) are hard to retain [30], [31].
In this work, we directly work with the continuous action and state space by considering agents use policy
gradient learning algorithms. In particular, we assume the class of policies where the actions are parameterized by
the mean of distributions (e.g., Gaussian policies). The major contribution of this work is in the following: we
prove that when the price function is linear or when there are two agents, there is a unique Nash equilibrium (NE)
in the stochastic Cournot game, and the policy gradient converges exponentially quickly to the NE. This is the first
result (to the best of our knowledge) on the convergence property of algorithms with continuous action spaces that
do not fall in the no-regret class.
1In this a first-order approximation of the locational marginal pricing used by markets in the United States.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II covers the background and prior works on standard
Cournot games and policy gradient algorithm. Section III describes the stochastic Cournot game and sketches
the convergence proof for policy gradient agents in Cournot games. Section IV provides detailed proof of the
convergence result. We provide several case studies in Section V that demonstrate the convergence behavior of
agents in various settings. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and outlines directions for future work.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Cournot Game
Definition 1 (Cournot Game). Consider N players produce homogeneous products in a limited market, where the
action space of player i is its production level xi ≥ 0. The utility function of player i is denoted as pii(x) =
p(
∑N
j=1 xj)xi − Ci(xi), where p is the market price (inverse demand) function that maps the total production
quantity to a price in R and Ci(·) is the cost function of player i.
The goal of each player i in the Cournot game is to choose the best production quantity xi such that maximizes his
utility pii. An important concept in game theory is the Nash equilibrium, at which state no player can increase their
payoffs by unilaterally changing their strategies. A Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game defined by (pi1, ..., piN )
is a vector x∗ ≥ 0 such that for all i:
pii(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ pii(x˜i,x∗−i), for all x˜i, (1)
where x−i denotes the actions of all players except i. In this paper, we restrict our attention to Cournot games
satisfying the following assumptions:
Assumption. We assume the price function and cost functions:
(A1) The price function p is concave, strictly decreasing and twice differentiable on [0, ymax], where ymax is the
first point where p becomes 0. For y > ymax, p(y) = 0. In addition, p(0) > 0.
(A2) The cost function Ci(xi) is convex, strictly increasing, twice differentiable and p(0) > C ′i(0), for all i.
These assumptions are standard in the literature (e.g., see [32] and references within). The assumption p(0) >
C ′i(0) is to avoid the triviality of a player never participating in the game. The following proposition shows that
Cournot game satisfying the above assumptions has an unique Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. A Cournot game satisfying (A1) and (A2) has exactly one Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1 refers to Theorem 1 in [33].
B. Policy-based Reinforcement Learning
In this work, we adopt a policy-based methods of how agents would learn and act. For each agent, we assume that
it has (possibly noisy) information of the system states at time t, which we denote by st. This agent maintains a policy
piθ(·|st), which is a probability distribution on the action it would take, conditioned on the agents information st. At
4each time step, after the agent picks actions at ∼ piθ(·|st), the system releases reward. Subsequently, players update
their policy parameters along the gradient direction of their long-term expected reward. Such learning procedure is
called policy gradient method [34] in the literature. As a key permise for the idea, the policy long-term reward is,
J(θ) = Eτ∼pθ(τ)[
∑
t
r(st,at)] (2)
and the gradient is given by,
∇θJ(θ) = Eτ∼pθ(τ)[(
T∑
t=1
∇θ log piθ(at|st))(
T∑
t=1
r(st,at))] , (3)
where τ and J(θ) are trajectories and the expected trajectory return under policy piθ, respectively, and∇θ log piθ(at|st))
is the score function of the policy. Various of policy gradient methods have been proposed by estimating the gradi-
ent (3) in different ways, including REINFORCE [34], natural policy gradient [35] and actor-crtic algorithms [36].
III. STOCHASTIC COURNOT GAME
We discuss the main convergence results in this section. As briefly mentioned, we consider policy-based models
of how agents choose and evolve their actions. In particular, as the agents only get the reward as feedback and
nothing else, the dynamics in Section II-B reduces to the stateless version. This is consistent with the practice of
many social-economic systems (e.g., energy markets [37]), where providing full feedback is either impractical or
explicitly disallowed due to privacy and market power concerns.
In particular, we consider a policy that is parameterized by the mean of a distribution. This model includes many
popular algorithms, for example, the ubiquitous Gaussian policies and their extensions [38]. Let θi denote the mean
of player i’s action, and Xi to be a zero-mean random variable. For convenience, we assume it is continuous and
has a bounded density function denoted by fi(Xi). We say Xi is unimodal at mean if fi has a global maximum
at the mean and no other isolated local maxima 2.
At each time step, player i choose the action to play as ai ∼ piθi(·) = θi+Xi. Note that in most Cournot games,
the action is interpreted as quantity, that cannot be negative. Therefore, player i has to play by drawing a quantify
from the rectified distribution (θi + Xi)+, where a+ = max(a, 0). Under the Cournot game setup, the expected
profit in Eq. (2) can be written out as the follows,
Ji(θi;θ−i) = EX
p
 N∑
j=1
(θj +Xj)
+
 (θi +Xi)+
−Ci((θi +Xi)+)
]
.
(4)
and the gradient value in Eq. (3) equals,
∇θiJi = E
[
1(θi +Xi ≥ 0)
{
p′
(
N∑
j=1
(θj +Xj)
+
)
(θi +Xi)
+p
(
N∑
j=1
(θj +Xj)
+
)
− C′i(θi +Xi)
}]
, (5)
2For example, Gaussian and uniform distributions are unimodal under this definition.
5where 1(·) is the indicator function.
We call the game associated with these Ji’s the stochastic Cournot game, where player i chooses θi, observe the
profit Ji, and update θi according to the payoff gradient. The Nash equilibrium of the stochastic Cournot game is
defined as, (θ∗1 , ..., θ
∗
N ) such that ∇θ∗i Ji = 0,∀i. The form of (5) has made analyzing the system dynamics difficult
compared to standard Cournot games. Firstly, because the actions are rectified, the profit of player i not long just
depends on the sum of the other players (as in a Cournot game), but it actually depends on each of the other players’
parameters. This rules out many elegant and simple results on the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria [39],
[40], [41], [42]. Secondly, although the realization fo the actions are nonnegative, it is not obvious that θi’s need
to be nonnegative, or even bounded. The main result in the paper is to overcome these challenges and show that
under some assumptions, the game is well-behaved and policy gradient updates converge exponentially quickly to
the Nash equilibrium in Stochastic Cournot games.
Theorem 1. Consider a stochastic Cournot game satisfying the assumptions (A1) and (A2). Suppose each player’s
policy is parameterized as the mean θi and a zero-mean random variable Xi that is unimodal at the mean with
infinite support, and suppose that all players follow policy gradient in (5) to update their mean. Then the policies
converge to the Nash equilibrium exponentially quickly for all initializations either of the following condition holds:
1) The price function is linear.
2) The number of players equals two.
The condition of the theorem includes Gaussian policies, which is a natural choice for continuous action
spaces [34], [43], and such a form also includes popular neural network policies [44] where the mean can be
parameterized via a neural network. We also do not restrict the players to be symmetric, and each of the players
would adopt different variances or even have completely different classes of distributions. The infinite support
requirement of the distribution is a technicality and can be weakened, although it would make the proofs much
more cumbersome.
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds in three lemmas. We defer the full proofs of these lemmas to Section IV and
sketch the steps in the proof here. The first step in the proof is to show that we can restrict the actions of the
players to a compact region using the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, θi can be restricted to [θi, ymax], where θi is a constant.
This lemma essentially confines the choices of the players to a compact interval, which sets up the rest of the
proof. As a reminder, ymax is the point where the price function becomes 0. The proof of this lemma is based
on showing that player i’s profit will be suboptimal if it chooses an θi outside of the interval, regardless of other
players’ choices.
Interestingly, to show the parameters of the policy gradients converges to the Nash equilibrium of the stochastic
Cournot game for the two cases stated in Theorem 1, we need two different proof techniques. Therefore, we separate
them into two lemmas as stated below.
6Lemma 2. Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A2) and suppose the market price is linear, the policy gradient updates
converge to the unique Nash equilibrium exponentially fast under all initial conditions.
Lemma 3. Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A2) and suppose there are only two players, the policy gradient updates
converge to the unique Nash equilibrium exponentially fast under all initial conditions.
The proof of Lemma 2 leverages Rosen’s conditions in [45]. A sufficient condition for the convergence of
gradient-based algorithms in concave N-player games is that the game Hessian is negative definite. Therefore, we
prove Lemma 2 in two steps. First is to show that the stochastic Cournot games with assumptions of (A1)-(A2)
are concave N-player game, and then show the game Hessian is negative definite under linear price functions.
However, once the price function is not linear, we cannot directly use Rosen’s conditions for the convergence proof,
even under the two-player case. The proof of Lemma 3 is based on a dynamical system interpretation. We proved
that under the two-player general price function setup, the game Hessian is strictly diagonally dominant with all
eigenvalues in the left-half plane, thus the Nash equilibrium is an exponentially stable fixed point.
We close this section with two remarks. Firstly, our proof provides the sufficient conditions for the convergence
of policy gradient in Cournot games, that is either the price function is linear, or the player number is no more
than two for general price function. However, these may not be necessary. We provide a three-player example with
quadratic price function in Section V-C, where we also observe convergence behavior. Secondly, it should be noted
that in practice, some players may decide to not follow the policy gradient updates and use other learning algorithms
(or act in adversarial manners). We provide some empirical evaluations of the system robustness in Section V-C, by
assuming a small portion of players is acting randomly. Both directions, 1) generalizing the convergence proof to
a broader class of games and 2) dynamics under heterogeneous/adversarial learning agents are important as future
works.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we prove the three major lemmas stated in the previous section.
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality, we can consider player 1. Fix the other player’s choices of θ’s. Define the random
variable Y =
∑N
i=2(θi+Xi)
+. We first prove that it is never beneficial for player 1 to set θ1 to a value larger than
ymax. Consider the derivative of J1 with respect to θ1
g1 =
∂
∂θ1
E
[
p
(
(θ1 +X1)
+ + Y
)
(θ1 +X1)
+ − C1
(
(θ1 +X1)
+
)]
=E [1(θ1 +X1 ≥ 0) {p′ (θ1 +X1 + Y ) (θ1 +X1)
+p
(
(θ1 +X1)
+ + Y
)− C ′1(θ1 +X1)}] , (6)
7where 1(·) is the indicator function. We want to show that if θ1 ≥ ymax, the derivative is negative. The last term
−E [1(θ1 +X1 ≥ 0)C ′i(θ1 +X1)] is negative because Ci is strictly increasing. Now consider the first two terms,
and let fY be the density of Y ,
E [1(θ1 +X1 ≥ 0) {p′ (θ1 +X1 + Y ) (θ1 +X1) + p (θ1 +X1 + Y )}]
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1(θ1 + x1 ≥ 0) {p′ (θ1 + x1 + y) (θ1 + x1) + p (θ1 + x1 + y)} f1(x)fY (y)dxdy
(a)
=
∫ ymax
0
∫ ymax−y−θ1
−θ1
[p′ (θ1 + x1 + y) (θ1 + x1) + p (θ1 + x1 + y)] f1(x)fY (y)dxdy
(b)
=
∫ ymax
0
∫ ymax−y
0
[p′ (x′1 + y) (x
′
1) + p (x
′
1 + y)] · f1(x′ − θ1)fY (y)dxdy, (7)
where (a) follows from assumption (A1) and (b) from a change of variable from x1 to x′1 = θ1 + x1. Next we
show that for any given y,
∫ ymax−y
0
p′ (x′1 + y) (x
′
1) + p (x
′
1 + y) dx = 0. Using the integration by parts on the first
term, denoting y¯ = ymax − y, we have∫ ymax−y
0
p′ (x′1 + y) (x
′
1) + p (x
′
1 + y) dx
=p(x′1 + y)x
′
1|x
′
1=y¯
x′1=0
−
∫ y¯
0
p (x′1 + y) +
∫ y¯
0
p (x′1 + y)
=0.
By assumption (A1), p′ (x′1 + y) (x
′
1) + p (x
′
1 + y) is positive at x
′
1 = 0. Therefore, it must undergo a sign change
from positive to negative. However, by the unimodality assumption, θ1 ≥ ymax, f1(x1−θ1) is an increasing function
on the interval x1 ∈ [0, ymax − y]. Therefore,
∫ ymax−y
0
[p′ (x′1 + y) (x
′
1) + p (x
′
1 + y)] f1(x
′ − θ1)dx < 0 for all y
and this proves that player 1 would never choose θ1 to be larger or equal to ymax.
Now we show that there is a lower bound on θ1. The partial derivative of g1 with respect to θj is
∂g1
∂θj
= E
[
1(θ1 +X1 ≥ 0, θj +Xj ≥ 0) ·
{
p′′
(
N∑
j=1
(θj +Xj)
+
)
· (θ1 +X1) + p′
(
N∑
j=1
(θj +Xj)
+
)}]
< 0
where the inequality follows from p is strictly decreasing and concave. Similar calculations can be used to show
that all cross partials are negative. Therefore, player 1 should decrease θ1 as other players increase their parameters.
From the first part of the proof, suppose all other players choose ymax as their play. Even at this choice, g1 still
becomes positive for negative enough θ1’s, therefore implying that the choice of θ1 is lower bounded by some real
number θ1.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 1 shows that the action space is convex and compact. Let G denote the Hessian of the game, so
Gij =
∂2Ji
∂θi∂θj
=
∂gi
∂θj
.
8Focusing on the diagonal terms, we have
Gii =
∂2Ji
∂θ2i
= E
[
1(θi +Xi ≥ 0) ·
{
p′′
(
N∑
j=1
(θj +Xj)
+
)
·(θi +Xi) + 2p′
(
N∑
j=1
(θj +Xj)
+
)
− C′′i (θi +Xi)
}]
< 0, (8)
which is negative by assumptions (A1) and (A2). A game is said to be a concave N-player game [45] if Gii < 0,∀i
and the action space is convex and compact. Therefore, it is a concave N-player game. The following proposition
is given in [45] as a sufficient condition to show when gradient-based algorithms converge to Nash equilibriums:
Proposition 2. Let G denote the Hessian of a concave N-player game. If GT +G is negative definite over the
space of actions, there is a unique Nash equilibrium and the policy gradient dynamics approach it exponentially
quickly for all initializations.
Using Proposition 2, it suffices for us to show that the negative definiteness of GT + G under the stochastic
Cournot game. The main challenge of proving the negative definiteness lies in the expectation term, and we need
to relate the properties of the Hessian of a function to its expectation. The following proposition tackles the
aforementioned challenge and relates the Hessian property to its expectation.
Proposition 3. Let f : RN → R be a continuous function and suppose that the first and second order partial
derivatives exist for all points except possibly for a set of measure 0. Let G be the Hessian of f , whenever it
exists. Now consider the function fˆ : RN → R, where fˆ(y) = EXf(y +X) and X is random vector in RN , with
continuous and bounded density function and infinite support. Let Gˆ be the Hessian of fˆ . Then: i) If GT +G is
negative semidefinite at all points where G exists, then GˆT + Gˆ is negative semidefinite. ii) If GT +G is negative
definite for a set of measure larger than 0, then GˆT + Gˆ is negative definite.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is straightforward. By the assumption on the random vector X , we can switch
the order of differentiation and the expectation. In addition, the density being continuous allows us to ignore the
points where G does not exist. Then
vT (GT (y) +G(y))v
= EX
[
vT (GT (y +X) +H(y +X))v
] ≤ 0,
for any v. Now suppose GT (y + x) + G(y + x)) is negative definite for set of positive measure, then by the
continuity of the density function, vT (GT (y)+G(y))v < 0 for all nonzero v and GˆT +Gˆ is negative definite.
Let fi(x) = p(
∑
i x
+
i )x
+
i , which is continuous and twice differentiable except for a measure zero set on RN .
Since Ji = E[fi(θ+X)], we need to show f =
[
f1 . . . fN
]
satisfies the condition of Proposition 3. Given a vector
x, without loss of generality, assume that x1, . . . , xk ≥ 0 and xk+1, . . . , xN < 0. The second order derivatives of
f are,
∂2fi
∂xi∂xj
=1 (xi ≥ 0) ·
p
′′(
∑
l x
+
l )xi + 2p
′(
∑
l x
+
l )− C′′i (xi), i = j
1(xj ≥ 0)
(
p′′(
∑
l x
+
l )xi + p
′(
∑
l x
+
l )
)
, i 6= j
.
9Because of the indicator on both xi ≥ 0 and xj ≥ 0, the Hessian is only nonzero for the upper left block. In
this block, we have ∀i, j ≤ k,
∂2fi
∂xi∂xj
=
p
′′(
∑k
l=1 xl)xi + 2p
′(
∑k
l=1 xl)− C ′′i (xi), i = j
p′′(
∑k
l=1 xl)xi + p
′(
∑k
l=1 xl), i 6= j,
.
When the price function is linear, the second order derivative term vanishes, i.e. p′′(
∑k
l=1 xl) = 0. Therefore,
we have,
∂2fi
∂xi∂xj
=
2p
′(
∑k
l=1 xl)− C ′′i (xi) if i = j, i, j ≤ k
p′(
∑k
l=1 xl) if i 6= j, i, j ≤ k
Now we can write G as G1 +G2 +G3 where
G1 =


p′(
∑k
l=1 xl) · · · p′(
∑k
l=1 xl)
...
. . .
...
p′(
∑k
l=1 xl) · · · p′(
∑k
l=1 xl)


0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0


0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0


0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0


(9)
Both G2,G3 are diagonal matrices. For G2, it has the i’th component being p′(
∑k
l=1 xl) for i ≤ k and 0 for
i > k. Since Xi have infinite support, there exists cases where k = N (all player sample non-negative actions) for a
measure larger than 0 set, in which G2 is negative definite. For G3, it has the i’th component being −C ′′i (xi) ≤ 0
for i ≤ k and 0 for i > k, thus it is negative semi-definite. Therefore, it suffices for us to show the negative
semi-definess of G1.
The eigenvalues of G1 in Eq. (9) are the combination of eigenvalues of the upper left and lower-right matrices.
Eigenvalues of the upper left matrix are kp′(
∑k
l=1 xl) < 0 and 0 (k−1 repeats), and eigenvalues of the lower right
are all zeros. Thus G1 is negative semi-definite.
Therefore, there exists an measure nonzero set of actions, such that G = G1 +G2 +G3 is negative definite. By
Proposition 3, we have the Hessian of (J1, ..., JN ), that is Gˆ is negative definite.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Now, consider the two-player Cournot games with general price function p(·) under assumption (A1) and (A2).
There are four cases considering the positiveness of x1 and x2.
a) x1, x2 ≥ 0:
Ga =
p
′′(x1 + x2)xi + 2p′(x1 + x2)− C ′′i (xi), i = j,
p′′(x1 + x2)xi + p′(x1 + x2), i 6= j,
b) x1 < 0, x2 ≥ 0:
Gb =
0 0
0 p′′(x1 + x2)x2 + 2p′(x1 + x2)

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c) x1 ≥ 0, x2 < 0:
Gc =
p′′(x1 + x2)x1 + 2p′(x1 + x2) 0
0 0

d) x1 < 0, x2 < 0:
Gd =
0 0
0 0

The game Hessian matrix thus follows,
Gˆ = E [1(x1, x2 ≥ 0)Ga + 1(x1 < 0, x2 ≥ 0)Gb
+1(x1 ≥ 0, x2 < 0)Gc + 1(x1 < 0, x2 < 0)Gd] , (10)
Ga is a strictly diagonally dominant matrix since the magnitude of the diagonal entry is strictly larger than the sum
of the magnitudes of all the other (non-diagonal) entries in each row, i.e., |p′′(x1 +x2)xi+2p′(x1 +x2)−C ′′i (xi)| >
|p′′(x1 + x2)xi + p′(x1 + x2)|,∀i. Given that Gb,Gc,Gd are all diagonally dominant matrices, Gˆ in Eq. (10) is a
strictly diagonally dominant matrix . Therefore, the eigenvalues of matrix Gˆ are all in the lefthalf plane (i.e., the
real parts of eigenvalues are negative) by the Gershgorin circle theorem [46]. Proposition 4 in [47] showed that
when all eigenvalues of the Hessian are in the open lefthalf plane, then the Nash equilibrium is an exponentially
stable fixed point of the dynamical system generated by the gradient descend algorithm.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we exam the performance of policy gradient algorithms in various of Cournot games. We first
verify the convergence behavior under linear price and two-player cases. Next, we provide investigative studies
on the system behavior under multi-player and players with random actions scenarios is well as intuitions for the
robustness behavior.
A. Experiment Setup
We perform all the experiments using the natural policy gradient algorithm [35] with a Gaussian policy. Following
the derivations in Section II-B, the gradient with respect to the policy parameter θi follows,
∇θiJi(θi) = Ex[pii(xi, x−i)∇θi log fθi(xi)]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
pˆii∇θi log fθi(xi) , (11)
where pii(xi, x−i) is the payoff function of player i and pˆii is the observed payoff. In the above formula, fθi(xi) =
θi +Xi is the decision making policy for player i and Xi ∼ N(0, σi). For the action, we have xi = (µi +Xi)+,
where the action is truncated to be non-negative. The update rules for µi follows the natural policy gradient in
[35]. We choose the standard deviation for each player the same as σ = 0.05. All experiments are run using a 2.2
GHz Intel Core i7 Macbook Pro with 16 GB memory.
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(a) G1 (b) G2
(c) G3 (d) G4
Fig. 1: Convergence behavior of policy gradient in stochastic Cournot games: (a)-(b) are games with linear price
and (c)-(d) are two-player games with general price functions.
B. Cournot Game Examples
In this section, we verify the convergence behavior of the proposed algorithm in four example Cournot games, with
different price and individual cost settings. G1: three-player with linear price function p(x) = 1−(x1+x2+x3) and
no individual cost Ci(xi) = 0,∀i. The Nash equilibrium is x∗1 = x∗2 = x∗3 = 14 . G2: three-player with linear price
function p(x) = 1−(x1+x2+x3) and differnet individual cost Ci(xi) = 0.1·i·xi for player i. The Nash equilibrium
is x∗1 = 0.3, x
∗
2 = 0.2, x
∗
3 = 0.1. G3: two-player quadratic price function p(x) = 1− (x1 + x2)2 without cost. The
Nash equilibrium is x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
√
1/8 ≈ 0.3536. G4: two-player cubic price function p(x) = 1 − 12 (x1 + x2)3
without cost. The Nash equilibrium is x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
3
√
1/20 ≈ 0.3684. In all of the games, each player simultaneously
picks a production level. The price is determined by the sum of productions and broadcasted back to all players.
This game is repeated multiple times with all players use policy gradient to learn and act. The dynamics of the
policy parameter (i.e., the mean) are plotted in Figure 1. In all simulated games with different initializations and
settings, the policy parameters converge to the Nash equilibrium, which verifies the theoretical results in Section III.
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(a) G5 (b) G6
Fig. 2: Dynamics of policy gradient beyond the convergence condition provided in Theorem 1.
C. Investigative Studies
In this section, we provide two investigative studies relating to system performance under more general setups: 1)
multi-agent Cournot game with non-linear price function; 2) hetergenous players that do not follow policy gradient
updates. Note that our theoretical result in Section III does not apply to the following two cases. G5: three-player
with quadratic price function p(x) = 1− (x1 + x2 + x3)2 and no cost. G6: three-player with linear price function
p(x) = 1− (x1 + x2 + x3) and no individual cost. One player does not follow policy gradient updates.
Fig 2 shows that both the three-player general price and heterogeneous players cases also converge to some
equilibria, though they do not satisfy the convergence conditions in Theorem 1, These results are promising in the
sense that our results might be able to generalize to a broader class of games, and theoretically proving these would
be valuable future work. There may also be settings where players are malicious, but designing optimal adversarial
tactics and the detection algorithms, by themselves are topics that contain a vast body of literature and is beyond
the scope of this work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the interaction of strategic players in Cournot games with limited feedback. We proved
the convergence of policy gradient reinforcement learning to the Nash equilibrium, where player’s policy is param-
eterized by the mean, under two conditions: either the price function is linear or there are two players. Extending
the results to more general conditions such as multi-player general price functions would be an important future
direction.
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